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LEGAL ASPECTS OF POSTAL MONEY ORDERS
John D. O'Malleyt
The postal money order, sales of which in recent years have averaged
243 million annually, looms as an unwelcome, nonnegotiable fellow traveler
of checks and, other negotiable instruments moving through banking
channels. The author reviews the cases involving the distribution of losses,
most of which the Government eschews, that arise from fraudulently issued,
stolen, or raisedmoney orders. He concludes that postal money ordersshould
be subject to commercial law since there is no longer any reasonable legal
basis for treating their issuance as a protected sovereign function.
For more than a century,1 the Post Office Department has issued
postal money orders for the purpose of providing a "cheap, immediate
and safe agency for the transfer through the mails of small sums of
money."2 The continuing popularity of the system3 is evident from the fact
that in 1965 more than 42 billion dollars were transferred by postal
money orders.' In view of the significant number of money orders in use
today,5 it is surprising that the legal and banking communities have given
only scant consideration to the legal nature of the instrument itself and
to a determination of who will bear the loss resulting from fraudulent
issue, forgery, or alteration.6 While a new encounter with a potential loss
from a bad money order can be expected to invite out of the dusty book
shelves all of the decisions treating loss distribution,' a look at the existing
t Professor of Business Law, Loyola University, Chicago. B.S. (with honors) 1950, MA.
1952, J.D. 1953, Loyola University. Member of the Illinois (1953) and Michigan (1953) Bars.
1 The postal money order system was established by Act of Congress, May 17, 1864.
13 Stat. 76. It went into operation on November 1, 1864. Post. Gen. Ann. Rep. 241 n.14
(1965).
2 Post. Gen. Ann. Rep. 24 (1864).
3 The use of postal money orders is, of course, dwarfed by the tremendous volume of
checks. It is estimated that in 1962, 14.5 billion checks, with a dollar value of 4.7 trillion,
were &awn on banks in the United States. H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1964). In the same year, 251,842,000 postal money orders, with a value of 4.8 billion,
were issued. Post. Gen. Ann. Rep. 198, 241 (1965).
4 Id. at 241.
5 The dollar amount of money orders issued has expanded from $1,360,122 in 1865 to
$4,821,033,136 in 1965. Peak volume was reached in 1953 when $6,644,675,226 worth of
money orders were sold. Post. Gen. Ann. Rep. 241 (1965).
6 The few cases in this area are considered infra. One explanation for the relative
scarcity of reported decisions is that postal money orders are issued in amounts not to
exceed $100 and it is not economically feasible to bring, or defend, an action for such
small amounts. When, however, a large number of money orders are handled by one
person or organization, the deterrent no longer exists. Of the cases discussed in this article,
only five reveal the number and value of money orders involved. The number varies from
12 to 699 with loss ranging from $1,200 to about $63,000.
7 Legal research is usually prompted by a form-letter demand for reimbursement from
the Post Office Department. A typical letter is as follows:
Gentlemen:
Enclosed is a photostat of money order, serial number listed below, stolen in blank
in the burglary of a post office. As the result of the cashing of this stolen form through
your bank, the Government has suffered a financial loss and it is necessary to make
demand on you for the amount, $100.00. Please forward your remittance by means of
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state of the law will produce a somewhat confusing, if not alarming,
picture.
The statutes establishing the postal money order system were patterned,
with some modification,' after those adopted in 1848 in England.' The
actual form in which postal money orders are written has changed several
times since their inception, except that all forms have included the name
of the purchaser and the amount payable.' The earliest forms were drawn
by the postmaster at the place of purchase on the post office closest to the
place where the purchaser (remitter) intended to send the money order.
The payee was not named in the money order itself," but his name was
contained in the application form forwarded to the drawee post office. 2
It was contemplated that the application form would arrive at the
drawee post office before the holder requested payment, as this was the
only method of determining who was entitled to receive the money."
In later forms the payee was named, as were the drawer and drawee post
offices. The form in use today contains the stamped name of the issuing
post office, the issuer's initials, and the name of the payee; but the drawee
is omitted. Presumably, the unnamed drawee is now the Post Office
Department instead of any local post office.
NEGOTIABILITY OF POSTAL MONEY ORDERS

A review of the meager authority on postal money orders will produce
but one definite conclusion-a negative one. A postal money order is not
a negotiable instrument. 4 The obligations undertaken by the Governcheck payable to the Disbursing Officer, Post Office Department, in the enclosed envelope which requires no postage. Enclose a copy of this letter so that the remittance can be identified. The photostat may be retained by you.
The burglary of the post office and the cashing of this stolen form are being investigated by the Postal Inspection Service.
Sincerely yours,
(signed)
Director
Communication to a Lincoln, Nebraska bank from the Director, Money Order Division,
Post Office Department, dated August 5, 1965, on file in the Loyola Law Library. See also
note 71 infra.
8 See note 21 infra.
9 Post Office Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 88. A General Post Office was established in
England in 1660, 12 Car. II c. 35, and the issuance of postal money orders was authorized
in 1840. 3 & 4 Vict. c. 96, § 38.
10 The maximum amount for which the first postal money orders could be issued was
$30. Today, itis $100. 39 U.S.C. § 5102(b) (1964).
11 That form was discontinued in 1894. Ch. 21, § 9, 28 Stat. 33.
12 14 Ops. Att'y Gen. 119, 121 (1872).
13 Rogers, The Postal Power of Congress 31 (1916).
14 Bolognesi v. United States, 189 Fed. 335 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 726 (1911);
Jaselli v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 36 App. D.C. 159 (D.C. Cir. 1911); United States v. Stockgrowers' Nat'! Bank, 30 Fed. 912 (C.C.D. Colo. 1887); United States v. Arnhold & S.
Bleichroeder, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. Northwestern Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 35 F. Supp. 484 (D. Minn. 1940); Lewin v. United States, 170 F. Supp.
646 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
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ment in the issuance of postal money orders and their negotiability are
severely restricted by statute.' In commenting upon the absence of
freedom of circulation and of an unconditional promise to pay, the court
in Bolognesi v. United States" pointed out that: (1) The cashing of a
money order cannot, under ordinary circumstances, be made in advance
of the receipt of the corresponding advice. (2)

More than one indorse-

ment of a money order invalidates it. (3) After an order has once been
paid by whomsoever presented, the Department will not be further liable.

(4) Payment of orders will be withheld under a variety of circumstances. 1 7
And Judge Brewer of the Circuit Court for Colorado, later Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, stated in United
States v. Stockgrowers' Nat'l Bank" that:
It is undoubtedly true, as settled by the case of Cooke v. U.S., 91 U.S. 389,
that when the government descends from its position as sovereign and
deals in negotiable paper, it subjects itself to the ordinary rules controlling
negotiable paper the same as any individual. But these post-office orders
are not negotiable paper; they are orders drawn by one postmaster upon
another, payable to a particular person not named in the order itself, unknown save as to the particular parties to the transaction-the two postmasters and the party who obtains them-so that the protection which the
rules applicable to negotiable paper would lay around many transactions
do not avail the defendant in this case.19
The relevant provisions of 39 U.S.C. (1964) are:
§ 5101: To promote public convenience, and insure greater security in remitting
funds through the mail, the Postmaster General may maintain a money order system.
§ 5102(b): The Postmaster General may not permit a money order to be issued
under this chapter for more than $100.
§ 5103(a): The Postmaster General shall provide for the payment of money orders
to the payee, indorsee, or remitter at offices at which money orders are issued.
(b): When a money order has been lost the Postmaster General, upon evidence
satisfactory to him, may pay the face value thereof or issue a duplicate money order,
without charge, to the person he determines is entitled thereto.
(c): The records of the Department shall serve as the basis for adjudicating claims
for the payment of money orders.
(d): The Postmaster General may not pay a money order after twenty years
from the last day of the month of original issue. Claims for unpaid money orders are
forever barred unless received by the Department within that period.
§ 5104: The payee of a money order, by his written indorsement thereon, may
direct it to be paid to any other person who shall be entitled to payment upon furnishing such proof as the Postmaster General requires that the indorsement is genuine,
and that he is the person named therein. More than one indorsement renders an order
invalid. The holder of such an order, if otherwise entitled thereto, may obtain payment
under such application and proof of the genuineness of the indorsements as the Postmaster General requires.
§ 2408: The Postmaster General shall request the Attorney General to bring a suit
to recover with interest any payment made from moneys of, or credit granted by,
the Department or postal saving system as a result of (1) mistake; (2) fraudulent
representations; (3) collusion; or (4) misconduct of an officer or employee of the
Department.
113189 Fed. 335 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 726 (1911).
17 Id. at 337, referring to Postal Laws and Regulations §§ 1002, 1007, 1009.
18 30 Fed. 912 (C.C.D. Colo. 1887).
'9 Id. at 914.
'5
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However, the unity of opinion concerning the nonnegotiable character
of a postal money order 20 has not produced results exhibiting perfect
logical consistency. For example, although he will not permit the purchaser of a postal money order to stop payment 2' without surrendering
20 It has also been held in England that postal money orders are not negotiable instruments. Fine Art Soc'y, Ltd. v. Union Bank, 17 Q.B.D. 705 (1886). The bank in that case
was held to have wrongfully converted the proceeds of postal orders payable to the plaintiff but credited to the personal account of the plaintiff's embezzling employee. Although
the decision has been criticized, Pagent, The Law of Banking 144-145 (4th ed. 1930),
because the court failed to give effect to provisions of the Post Office Act, see note 67 infra,
which provides that no banker collecting a postal order shall be liable to anyone but
the principal for having received payment, the decision appears correct since the bank
acted for the wrong principal.
21 In reply to an inquiry from Postmaster General J. A. Creswell concerning the right of
a remitter to stop payment of a postal money order without surrendering it, Attorney
General George H. Williams, in 14 Ops. Att'y Gen. 119, 121-22 (1872), wrote:
These provisions, it will be seen, make the money-order, to a certain extent, a
negotiable instrument; enable the indorsee, seemingly without the permission of the
remitter, to obtain a new order from the Postmaster-General; authorize the Postmaster-General to issue a duplicate in case the money-order has been lost, upon
application of the remitter or payee; and expressly provide that the postmaster issuing
the order shall repay the amount of it upon the application of the remitter and the
return of the order. Extensive powers are confided by the statute to the PostmasterGeneral in respect to the form of the order; and the form authorized by him, while
omitting the name of the payee, does state the amount for which the order is given.
Although the money and the fee are paid by the remitter of the order, and the contract of the Government is in the first place with him, yet, upon full consideration,
I am of opinion that the statute did not intend that the remitter should be able to
revoke the order, or to demand back his money against the objection of the payee. He
cannot obtain repayment of the money deposited unless he produces the order. The
order may be indorsed once, and the indorsee may secure a new order by application
to the Postmaster-General. It would seem, therefore, to be the intention of Congress
to give these orders in many respects the character of ordinary negotiable instruments,
in order that full credit may be given to them, and, consequently, that their use be
greatly extended. It was the intention of Congress, as shown by the statute, that the
payee or holder of the order shall be able to obtain the money notwithstanding the
objection of the remitter, and although the latter may desire to recall it. But if there is
any doubt in regard to this, so far as our statutes themselves are concerned, I think
that there is another circumstance which renders this view of the question decisive.
The money-order system was established in the English post-office department more
than thirty years ago, and is principally regulated there now by the statute of 11 and
12 Victoria, chap. 88, passed in 1848, and contained in the 88th volume of the English
Statutes at Large, 562, and the systems in the two countries are so similar as to make
it very apparent that the English statutes and regulations were considered in draughting
the laws establishing our own system. By the English statute above cited, section 111,
it is enacted "That it shall be lawful for the postmaster-general at any time hereafter
to repay or refund the amount of any money-orders, either heretofore granted or issued
to the person or persons to whom the same have been or shall or may be so granted
or issued, . . .whether such money-orders shall remain or be in the possession of such
person or persons or not."
Under this statute, as you inform me, it has been decided in England by the solicitor
of the post-office (and very properly decided) that the remitter can forbid the
payment of the order against the protest of his payee; but the omission to insert
any similar provision in our own statute, and the insertion of one expressly limiting the
power of repayment to cases where the remitter produces the order, seems to me to
show conclusively that it was the intention of Congress not to adopt this provision
of the English statute, but to increase the credit attaching to the orders by rendering
them irrevocable when delivered by the remitter to the payee.
I am of the opinion, therefore, in the cases you mention, that the payee of the moneyorder is entitled to the money upon demand, and upon complying with the statutes
and regulations of the Post-Office Department, notwithstanding the protest of the remitter, and that the remitter of the money-order cannot forbid the payment of it by
any notice to the office at which it is made payable before it has been paid.
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the item, 22 the Postmaster General can, on his own initiative, stop payment of money orders in the possession of parties who are, in his judgment,
conducting a lottery through the mails.2 3
The reverse side of the money order form in current use contains a
statement giving notice to the payee and his indorsee that only one
indorsement is authorized by law.2" However, the statute does permit
payment to be made to the holder of a money order containing more
than one indorsement if the holder can establish the validity of his title.25
In Lewin v. United States,26 the plaintiff held ninety-five money orders,
with a value of $8,344, which he had purchased as second indorsee while
residing in the Philippine Islands. Since all the money orders bore a
second indorsement, the Postmaster General refused to make payment
unless the holder produced evidence of the validity of the indorsements
and of his ownership. Lewin was unable to locate or even identify any of
the payees or remitters named in the money orders, and the Court of
Claims, in upholding the position of the Postmaster General, stated:
The instruments involved in this case are not "negotiable instruments"
and are not therefore governed by the laws applicable to commercial paper.
They are specialties called "money orders" and are governed by the postal
laws. In order for the plaintiff to receive payment he must comply with
the procedure required by those laws. In order to obtain payment on these
money orders he must "make proof of the genuineness of the indorsements
as the Postmaster General may require." The mere fact that the plaintiff
is a holder for value is not sufficient. The issue is whether the plaintiff
has complied with the statutory requirements. We hold that he has not
the Postmaster
met these requirements and that in refusing payment,
27
General acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously.

22 There is no intention to imply that payment of a postal money order could be stopped
by the remitter if it were a negotiable instrument. A money order, as a purchased draft
drawn by the Government on itself, is analogous to a purchased cashier's check or bank
money order payable to someone other than the purchaser. Payment of a cashier's check
or bank money order cannot be stopped by the one who procures its issuance. Walker v.
Sellers, 201 Ala. 189, 77 So. 715 (1918); Drinkall v. Movius State Bank, 11 N.D. 10, 15,
88 N.W. 724, 726 (1901) (dictum); Cross v. Exchange Bank Co., 110 Ohio App. 219, 220,
168 N.E.2d 910, 912 (1958); Scott v. Seaboard Securities Co., 143 Wash. 514, 517, 255 Pac.

660, 661 (1927). However, if the contention that a postal money order is not subject to the
law merchant is correct, the rationale behind the refusal to permit payment to be stopped
would, to a large extent, be inapplicable.
23 Enterprise Say. Ass'n v. Zumstein, 67 Fed. 1000 (6th Cir. 1895).
24 See 39 U.S.C. § 5104, quoted at note 15 supra. The statement on the money order
recites:
PAYEE MUST ENDORSE BELOW ON LINE MARKED 'PAYEE". OWNERSHIP
OF THIS ORDER MAY BE TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER PERSON OR FIRM
IF THE PAYEE WILL WRITE THE NAME OF SUCH PERSON OR FIRM ON
THE LINE MARKED 'PAY TO" BEFORE WRITING HIS OWN NAME ON
THE SECOND LINE. MORE THAN ONE ENDORSEMENT IS PROHIBITED BY
LAW. BANK STAMPS ARE NOT REGARDED AS ENDORSEMENTS.
Another statement on the reverse side informs all holders that the money order becomes
invalid after twenty years and thereafter no claim for payment will be considered. See 39
U.S.C. § 5103(d), quoted at note 15 supra.
25 See 39 US.C. § 5104, quoted at note 15 supra.
26 170 F. Supp. 646 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
27 Id. at 648.
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The Lewin case is considered here merely to illustrate the application
of one of the statutory provisions regulating postal money orders2 8 and to
demonstrate one of the effects of the nonnegotiable nature of such orders.
However, it would seem that for the Government to require the stated
proof of ownership in the complete absence of any evidence of the holder's
bad faith or an adverse claim (such as a request by the purchaser, payee,
or first indorsee for replacement of a lost or forged money order) is
clearly unreasonable in light of current commercial practices in comparable situations. Rather than completely denying payment in such cases,29
the Postmaster General could honor the holder's claim upon the submission of an affidavit of title and a corporate surety's bond indemnifying the
Government and any other party for any loss which might be sustained
as a result of an improper payment. If that procedure were followed,
there would be no undue burden of proof placed upon good faith purchasers of money orders containing more than one indorsement, and the
parties involved would be afforded sufficient protection from loss. 0
FRAUDULENTLY ISSUED MONY ORDERS

Probably the most troublesome cases concerning postal money orders
are those involving postal employees who issue money orders to innocent
persons as part of an embezzlement scheme. Indeed, the first case to
consider loss distribution in matters of bad postal money orders involved
such a situation. In United States v. Stockgrowers' Nat'l Bank,3" the
postmaster at Lewiston, Idaho, issued money orders drawn on the post
office at Pueblo, Colorado, without making payment for them. He then
sent the orders to the defendant bank with directions to deposit the proceeds to the account of one J. G. Wilson, a fictitious name assumed by
the postmaster. Shortly after the bank had received payment from the
post office in Pueblo, the postmaster withdrew most of the proceeds.
In refusing to accede to the Government's demand for repayment, the
bank grounded its defense on two well-established principles, namely,
that (1) a principal is bound by an agent's wrongful acts committed
within the scope of the agent's apparent authority, and (2) a final
28 See 39 U.S.C. § 5104, quoted at note 15 supra.
29 The court pointed out that Lewin had several years before the period of limitations

would expire in which to establish his right to the money orders. Lewin v. United States,
supra note 26, at 648. In view of the fact that he could not accomplish this during the
six years prior to the court's decision, however, it is questionable whether another fourteen
years would be of any help.
30 If a postal money order were a negotiable instrument, the holder would be deemed
prima fade a holder in due course and would not have to prove the genuineness of indorsements unless the question were properly put in issue. See Britton, Bills and Notes 249 (2d
ed. 1961).
31 30 Fed. 912 (C.C.D. Colo. 1887).
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payment is irrevocable. The court rejected the first contention, stating
that as a general principle of agency it does not apply to the Government,
and that as a principle of the law merchant it does not apply to postal
money orders, since they are not negotiable instruments."2 The court dismissed any consideration of the harshness of its position with the comment
that the "general weal of the public requires that the individual and not
the government should bear the burden of the conduct of the government's agent."' s However, as its basis for holding the bank liable, the
court considered that payment of the money orders by the post office at
Pueblo was only provisional, since a final determination of the validity
of the money orders and their issuance rested with the Post Office Department in Washington. 4 The conclusion does not seem supportable, however, in view of the fact that the money orders were actually drawn on
the post office at Pueblo, instead of the Post Office Department, and that
the former office had authority to pay them. 5 But the more unusual
aspect of the decision is that by holding final payment not to have taken
place, the court gave tacit approval to the bank's contention that the
concept of finality of payment, as established by the law merchant, s6 is
applicable to postal money orders. Conceivably, then, if payment had
been held to be final, the Government would not have been able to shift
37
its loss to the collecting bank.
The possibility of an early application of the law merchant to postal
money orders was effectively precluded, however, by the next case to
treat fraudulently issued money orders, Bolognesi v. United States.8 In
that case, one Marone, who was a banker as well as the clerk in charge of
a postal substation, issued to the appellants as payees 128 money orders
with a total value of $12,800. These money orders, which had been given
in payment of sums due the appellants for foreign currency surrendered to
Marone, as banker, for conversion into United States currency, were
presented to and paid by the Brooklyn Post Office. In ruling for the
Government, whose case was presented by the then assistant United States
32 See quotation in text accompanying note 19 supra.

3 United States v. Stockgrowers' Nat1 Bank, supra note 31, at 914.

34 To buttress its position, the court relied on Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389

(1875), which allowed recovery of money paid on forged treasury notes by a sub-treasurer
in New York City, since the Act authorizing issuance of the notes specifically provided
that payment was to be made by the Treasury Department itself. However, in the case
of postal money orders, the statute does not provide for payment other than at post
offices. See 39 U.S.C. § 5103(a), quoted at note 15 supra.
35 The current form of money order does not name a drawee. In practice, it is payable
at any post office or Federal Reserve Bank.
36 See note 58 infra.
87 If this conclusion is correct, the court would be in the contradictory position of apply-

ing the law merchant to payment but not to the liability of a principal for the acts of an
agent.
38 189 F. 335 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 726 (1911).
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Attorney Felix Frankfurter, and in refusing to apply the rules of the law
merchant by which the principal would be bound by the agent's actions
in issuing commercial paper, the court stated:
In the establishment and operation of the money order system the government exercises a governmental power for the public benefit. It serves the
public by furnishing a safe and cheap method for transmitting small sums
of money. It carries on the system not for gain, but to supply a public
need. It does not engage in business, but stands in its position of sovereignty.
Consequently the principles which govern commercial transactions between
individuals have little application in this case....
It follows as a corollary to the conclusion that the government in issuing
money orders exercises a governmental function and does not engage in a
commercial transaction that money orders are not negotiable instruments
subject to the defenses permitted by the law merchant to bona fide holders
for value. They stand in marked contrast to notes or similar obligations
which the government might issue to obtain money for its own use and
upon which it might incur all the responsibilities of a private person.3 9
It is not easy to assess the correctness of the legal judgments in the
Stockgrowers' and Bolognesi cases, especially in view of the harsh consequences visited upon innocent parties in the wake of some imponderables
of public policy. Standing together, the cases provide formidable authority
for the proposition that in the issuance of postal money orders the Government acts in its sovereign capacity, and the principles of the law merchant, whether concerned with the apparent authority of an agent or
finality of payment, are not applicable. A subsequent discussion will consider the validity of this proposition in view of current practices. 0
Another issue in cases involving postal money orders fraudulently
issued by postal agents is whether the negligence of the Government in
failing to discover the wrongdoing will operate as a bar to recovery. The
issue was not raised in the cases already considered, except inferentially
in United States v. Bolognesi.4 1 In offering a defense of good faith, 42
Bolognesi alleged that the Post Office Department, through an inspector,
had conducted an investigation of Marone's business dealings, including
the issuance of a large number of money orders to Bolognesi, and had
assured the latter that the transactions were in every respect right and
proper. He also alleged that some time after the investigation he asked a
postal auditor if Marone's practice in issuing money orders in payment of
his own banking obligations was permissible, and he received a reply that
there was no reason why Marone could not do it. Although the court, in
39

Id. at 336-37.

40 See text accompanying notes 74-89 infra.

The Bolognesi case is reported three times: twice on rulings on demurrer, United
States v. Bolognesi, 164 Fed. 159 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908), and 169 Fed. 1013 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1909); and finally on writ of error, Bolognesi v. United States, 189 Fed. 335 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 223 U.S. 726 (1911).
42 United States v. Bolognesi, 169 Fed. 1013, 1014 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909).
41
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sustaining the demurrer, ruled that such evidence of good faith would
present no defense to the Government's action, there is no indication that
it was asserted that the same evidence would demonstrate negligence on

the part of the Government.
The issue of negligence was properly raised in United States v. Citizens
& Southern Nat'l Bank,43 which involved a suit by the Government to

recover about $13,000 paid on 130 postal money orders issued for insufficient consideration by a post office clerk. The misappropriations took
place over a period of eight months during which the money orders were
sent to the defendant bank, to which they were made payable, for deposit
to the clerk's account. On the application forms retained at the issuing
post office, the clerk showed various parties as the purchasers and indicated that the orders were for sums ranging from one to six dollars,
with an aggregate principal amount of only $281.38. Not only did numerous other discrepancies and circumstances exist which should have alerted

the postmaster to the defalcations,44 but after the fraud was discovered
a delayed notice was given to the bank. In a trial without jury, the court
concluded that the Government was guilty "of such flagrant and continuing negligence,' 45 in the supervision of its employee and in the discovery and giving notice of the fraud as to constitute a bar to recovery.
It was without any apparent twinge of remorse that the court distinguished
prior cases4 6 and blandly ignored those which hold that the Government
is not chargeable with the knowledge or negligence of its employees in
the performance of governmental functions, 47 even in cases involving
negotiable instruments.48
In departing from the traditional view of governmental immunity, the
43 144 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Ga. 1956).

44 See note 51 infra.
45 United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 144 F. Supp. 601, 606 (S.D. Ga.
1956).
46 Ibid. The Bolognesi and Stockgrowers' Bank cases, and United States v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 35 F. Supp. 484 (D. Minn. 1940), were distinguished on
two grounds: (1) absence of evidence of gross negligence on the part of the Government,
and (2) failure to raise the issue that any defense which could be urged against a private
party may be offered against the Government when it is plaintiff.
47 National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945)
(Government
allowed to recover on checks paid over forged indorsements despite fact that fraud by
government clerk covered more than two years during which he obtained 144 checks payable
to various Marine Corps officers by submitting spurious pay and travel vouchers); Washington Loan & Trust -Co. v. United States, 134 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (Government's
negligence in failing to supervise and keep proper records not a bar to recovery on checks
paid with forged indorsements even though employee padded payroll with names of employees of imaginary 'C.C.C. camp and thereby obtained 1,072 checks over a four-year
period); United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 205 Fed. 433 (9th Cir. 1913), judgment aff'd on new opinion, 224 Fed. 679 (9th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 241 U.S. 658 (1916)
(Government employee's knowledge that checks were payable to fictitious payees not
imputed to Government). See Note, "Forged Government Checks: Misallocation of Loss by
the Federal Common Law," 66 Yale LJ. 1107 (1957).
48 See generally Wachtel, "Sovereign Immunity and Its Application to Commercial
Paper," 6 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1 (1936).
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court fastened its decision to those cases which have enunciated the
principle that any defense which can be asserted against an ordinary
party can be urged against the Government as plaintiff,49 since pleading
a defense, such as negligence, is not the same as seeking to recover
damages from the Government in a suit based upon the negligence of
its employees. In adopting this view, the court reasoned that:
If the plaintiff were allowed to recover, it would mean that a party whose
agents and employees were negligent could recover from a defendant who
was not even charged with fault. It is perfectly clear that if the plaintiff
were an ordinary citizen, the plaintiff could not recover. Likewise the
sovereign as plaintiff should not recover in this case. This is not a case
of the sovereign being harassed by an action being brought by one of its
subjects, but is a case of the sovereign coming into Court and asking for
justice 0°
While United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank is susceptible
to attack from the standpoint of precedent, the result is so clearly
demanded by the facts that it is doubtful that many legal voices of dissent will be heard to challenge the decision. However, since the court cut
such a wide swath in enumerating the acts which collectively, rather than
individually, constituted sufficient negligence to preclude recovery, 51 there
will be difficulty in applying the decision to cases with similar fact situations.
49 United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat Bank, supra note 45, at 605-06. The court
cited United States v. Norwegian Barque Thekla, 266 U.S. 328 (1924); Jones v. Watts,
142 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1944); United States v. Kiriaze, 172 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1949);
United States v. Moscow Seed Co., 14 F. Supp. 135 (D. Idaho 1936); Howard v. Cook,
59 Idaho 391, 83 P.2d 208 (1938). For a detailed discussion on the suability of the United
States, see generally "Development in the Law-Remedies Against the United States and
Its Officials," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 827 (1957).
50 United States v. Citizens & Southern Natl Bank, supra note 45, at 605. To support
its conclusion, the court quoted the statement of Mr. justice Holmes in United States v.
Norwegian Barque Thekla, supra note 49, at 339-40:
When the United States comes into Court to assert a claim it so far takes the position
of a private suitor as to agree by implication that justice may be done with regard
to the subject matter. The absence of legal liability in a case where but for its sovereignty it would be liable does not destroy the justice of the claim against it.
United States v. Citizens & Southern Natl Bank, supra at 606.
51 Id. at 605. The court stated:
I find the plaintiff's employees and agents were negligent in the following particulars:
(a) The Postmaster at Jesup trusted Martin and failed to make even a cursory
examination of the money order accounts, although post office regulations require that
a Postmaster closely supervise the money order business.
(b) The discrepancy between the stubs as filled out and as cut was noticeable to
casual inspection and not only should have been caught by Miss Murphy, the money
order clerk, but also by the Postmaster and Inspector Crawford when the latter made
a check of the Jesup, Georgia, post office, including the money order account, about
September 24, 1950.
(c) The Postmaster at Jesup failed to exercise adequate supervision over Martin
whom he permitted to write money orders without increasing his bond over the preexisting $1,000 bond and whom he permitted to handle money orders when no one
else was present without carefully checking him.
(d) The Postmaster at Jesup was negligent in failing to check the money order
account when he should have been suspicious of Martin whom he had known for years
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STOLEN BLANK MONEY ORDERS
As could be expected, the theft of blank money orders from post
offices, and their subsequent completion and transfer to innocent parties,
is not an unusual occurrence.2 Such a series of events was involved in
United States v. NorthwesternNat'l Bank & Trust Co.53 In that case, the
post office at Mississippi City, Mississippi was burglarized and the thief

stole both blank money orders and the rubber stamps used to validate

them. Twelve of the money orders were completed in usual form by the
thief for $100 each, drawn on the post office at Minneapolis, Minnesota,
payable to a fictitious payee. Though the defendant bank cashed the

money orders, it did so only after one of its clerks telephoned a branch
post office and received assurance from an unidentified postal clerk that
the described money orders were genuine. The postal clerk had overlooked
the fact that they were listed as stolen in a postal bulletin on file at the
branch. When the bank presented the money orders to the main Minneapolis post office for payment, the postal employees again failed to detect
them as stolen, and they were therefore honored. Despite the genuine but
unauthorized form of execution and the failure of the postal employees to
identify the money orders as stolen, judgment was rendered for the
Government.
In holding the bank liable for the Government's loss, the district court
based its decision upon the equitable right to recover money paid through
mistake of fact54 rather than on the statutory grounds relied upon in the
as a boy with very limited means and who, in a short period of time after he started
handling money orders, appeared in new clothes, acquired an interest in a restaurant
in Jesup and bought three or four new automobiles, including an Oldsmobile 98.
(e) It caused defendant, through its delay of 19 months in properly notifying defendant from the date when the first money order was fraudulently issued payable to
defendant and through a delay of 7 months from the date when plaintiff itself discovered the fraud, to lose the value of all moneys standing to the credit of Martin
in his checking account with defendant, and to lose the value of his equity in the other
assets he had, including a home, a car, plus his interest in the restaurant. The plaintiff
was again negligent in its agents and employees permitting these particular money
orders to be cashed at the post office in Savannah, Georgia, when the same were presented for payment.
52 During fiscal year 1965, there were 1,551 burglaries of post offices. Of the blank money
orders stolen, the total number of which is not reported, those with a potential value of
$2,391,900 were recovered before they could be cashed. Post. Gen. Ann. Rep. 146, 140
(1965). See note 7 supra.
53 35 F. Supp. 484 (D. Minn. 1940). See note 73 infra.
54 In summarizing the doctrine, the court stated:
Equity recognizes the right to recover money paid through mistake, and the negligence
of the payor does not affect the right of such recovery. In other words, if a benefit
is bestowed through mistake, no matter how careless or inexcusable the act of the
bestower may have been, the recipient of the benefit in equity must make restoration,
the theory being that restitution results in no loss to the recipient. He merely received
something for nothing.
United States v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 35 F. Supp. 484, 486 (D. Minn.
1940).
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Stockgrowers' and Bolognesi cases. 5 Although the court recognized that
by holding the bank responsible in such a case it might "impair the
mobility of these instruments in business transactions," 56 since banks
could not rely upon the "integrity of money orders, although accepted
and cashed by the Government,"5 7 it nevertheless rejected the bank's
argument that the concept of finality of payment, as embodied in the law
merchant and developed through the various ramifications of the doctrine
of Price v. Neal,58 was applicable also to postal money orders.59 The
55 See 39 U.S.C. § 2408, quoted at note 15 supra. While the similar, predecessor statute
was relied upon as a basis for recovery in the prior cases, in Bolognesi the court stated that
it was not negativing the possibility that in the absence of the statute the Government might
recover in a common-law action of indebitatus assumpsit. Bolognesi v. United States, 189
Fed. 335, 338 n.3 (1911).
Despite the language used, the statute does not confer upon the Government an absolute right of recovery. It states merely the basis for a claim, not from whom and under
what circumstances there is a basis for recovery. But to argue further the meaning of the
statute or attempt to ascertain its dominant thrust would provide nothing more than another example of legal minds paddling about in a sea of semantics, unable to keep an eye
fixed on the raft of central issues.
56 United States v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., supra note 54, at 490.
57 Ibid.
58 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762).
The legal obligation to repay money received through mistake of fact is abandoned
in cases where the drawee honors by payment or acceptance a draft bearing a forgery of
the drawer's signature. The existence of the exception is usually attributed to the celebrated
decision of Lord Mansfield in Price v. Neal, although the origin of the rule of law merchant
is traced to Jenys v. Fawler, 2 Strange 946, 93 Eng. Rep. 959 (K.B. 1715). The Jenys case,
which the plaintiff's attorney in Price v. Neal attempted to argue away, involved the enforcement of payment of an accepted bill of exchange containing a forgery of the drawer's
signature; Price v. Neal involved an unsuccessful attempt to recover payments made
on two forged bills of exchange, one of which had been accepted prior to payment.
The doctrine of Price v. Neal, that payment by a drawee (or drawer) or a forged instrument is final in favor of a good faith purchaser, has been followed with remarkable
consistency not only in this country but also in England and Scotland and reflects, as well,
the law in continental Europe. Ames, "The Doctrine of Price v. Neal," 4 Harv. L. Rev.
297, 298 (1891). The earliest decisions in the United States following the doctrine appear
to be United States Bank v. Bank of Georgia, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 333 (1825); Gloucester
Bank v. Salem Bank, 17 Mass. 32 (1820); Levy v. Bank of United States, 1 Binn. 27
(Pa. 1802).
Lord Mansfield's reported opinion in Price v. Neal contains so many conflicting rationales,
as if he were casting about for pegs stout enough to support his decision, that it has
provided material for as many theories as there are commentators to offer them. In general, the various theories searching for an explanation of the doctrine can be reduced
essentially to the propositions that a drawee cannot recover payment made on a check
or other instrument bearing a forged signature because of (1) his negligence in failing to
detect the forgery, (2) estoppel to deny what he has admitted by paying the item, that is,
the drawer's signature, which he is conclusively presumed to know, (3) the public policy
in favor of finality in commercial transactions, and (4) the lack of a superior equity.
While the theory that public policy favors finality in commercial transactions is generally
accepted today, Dedham Nat'l Bank v. Everett Nat'l Bank, 177 Mass. 392, 59 N.E. 62
(1901), there is absolutely no express support for the theory in Price v. Neal. The words
frequently seized upon to support it, though, are those of the reporter at 3 Burr. 1356,
97 Eng. Rep. 872: "Lord Mansfield stopt him from going on; saying that this was one of
those cases that could never be made plainer by argument." But these remarks prefaced
those about the equitable nature of the remedy sought and they have no independent
significance. When Price v. Neal is read in total, there can be little doubt that what Lord
Mansfield relied upon in refusing to permit the drawee to recover his mistaken payment
was his lack of a superior equity to that of the recipient of the money. As the foremost
advocate of that theory, Professor Ames stated:
The true principle, it is submitted, upon which cases like Price v. Neal are to be
supported, is that far-reaching principle of natural justice, that as between two persons
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court concluded that "the equitable doctrine of permitting a recovery
where there has been an unjust enrichment . . . should have greater
weight ...than the doctrine enunciated in Price v. Neal."6 0
DoCTRINE OF MlSTAiE

The court in the NorthwesternNat'lBank case not only devoted as little
time to considering the commercial aspects of postal money orders as Alexander gave to the Gordian Knot, but it also incorrectly applied the doctrine of mistake. Although the equitable rule that a mistaken payment can
be recovered, even though negligence surrounds the mistake, 61 is not
having equal equities, one of whom must suffer, the legal title shall prevail. The holder
of the bill of exchange paid away his money when he bought it; the drawee parted
with his money when he took up the bill. Each paid in the belief that the bill was
genuine. In point of natural justice they are equally meritorious. But the holder has
the legal title to the money. A court of equity (and the action of assumpsit for money
had and received is, in substance, a bill in equity) cannot properly interfere to compel
the holder to surrender his legal advantage.

Ames, supra at 299.
The doctrine of Price v. Neal has been incorporated into the Uniform Commercial Code
by providing, in Section 3-418, that "payment or acceptance of any instrument is final in
favor of a holder in due course, or a person who has in good faith changed his position in
reliance on the payment." The doctrine has not, in general, been extended to payment
or acceptance of an instrument containing a forged indorsement or an alteration, except
where drawer and drawee of an altered instrument are the same person. U.C.C. § 3-417.
In the decisional development under common law and the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, the drawee has been held entitled to recover its payment of a forged draft
when the party who received payment did not give value for the instrument, e.g., First
State Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 314 Ill.
269, 145 N.E. 382 (1924), or knew of
the forgery at the time of the transaction, e.g., Great American Ins. Co. v. Holiday Motors,
264 N.C. 444, 142 S.E.2d 13 (1965), or should have known of the forgery. E.g., Mechanics
Nat'l Bank v. Worcester County Trust Co., 341 Mass. 465, 170 N.E.2d 476 (1960). In
such cases, it is clear that the party who receives payment is not a holder in due course.
But even though the recipient may qualify as a holder in due course, many courts have
danced their way around Price v. Neal by maintaining that the recipient not only must
be in good faith but also must be free from negligence in order to prevent recovery by the
drawee. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. United States Nat'l Bank, 100 Ore. 264, 197 Pac. 547
(1921). Although the freedom-from-negligence concept mustered substantial support from
text writers, Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law § 62, at 915 (7th ed. Beutel 1948), as well
as the courts, the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code rejected the view except where
the negligence is of such a degree as to constitute bad faith. U.C.C. § 3-418, comment 4.
Thus, under the Code, the question would appear to be one of good faith or bad faith,
as the terms are used in determining status as a holder in due course, measured, however,
at the time the instrument is presented for acceptance or payment and not at the time

it is acquired. U.C.C. § 3-417, comment 4.
59 The court argued that inasmuch as the consensus of opinion now is that the only
satisfactory explanation for the doctrine of Price v. Neal is one of public policy in promoting the use of negotiable instruments by making the time of payment the time of final
and conclusive settlement, there is no reason why that policy should override the policy
evident in the immunities associated with the preformance of governmental functions. The
court stated:
If, therefore, we accept the view that the doctrine of Price v. Neal is primarily

one of public policy and in furtherance of the mobility of negotiable instruments in
the field of the law merchant, no cogent reason is suggested why it should be extended
to instruments issued by the Government in connection with the performance of a
public duty.

United States v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., supra note 54, at 489.

60 Id. at 490.
61 See Woodward, Quasi Contracts § 3 (1913). Woodward states:
No matter how ciose at hand the means of knowledge may be, no matter how stupid
or careless the failure to ascertain the truth may be, if one confers a benefit under
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open to serious question, it is not absolute. The rule is inapplicable in
any situation where an obvious injustice would be effected. Ordinarily
restitution results in no loss to the recipient of a payment made through
mistake, because the party was entitled to nothing in the first place. But
where the recipient has changed his position in reliance upon the payor's
mistake, justice does not dictate that the benefit be returned, since it
would result in a loss to the recipient.62 In the case at hand, 3 it is true
that in point of time the bank cashed the money orders before it received
payment from the post office and there was, therefore, no change in
position in reliance upon the payment itself. But the cashing was in
reliance upon an assurance from a postal clerk that the money orders
were valid.64 Thus, there was a change in position based upon the Government's mistake in characterizing the instruments as genuine, and the
existing equities would not require a return of the money received by the
bank. Although restitution is an equitable device used to achieve justice,
somewhere along an intangible line the concrete case becomes an abstraction and an absolute or rigid rule emerges from what originally was a malleable rule of equity. However, rules of equity were never intended to
develop myopic limitations simply because of age. The change in position
which will terminate the right to recover a mistaken payment does not
necessarily have to follow payment; in a proper case, it could precede it.
BANKS As AGENTS FOR COLLECTION

The position occupied by a bank in the handling of postal money
orders normally is that of an agent acting for a principal, rather than
that of a purchaser of the instrument, and this appears to be the case
whether the postal order is deposited by a customer for credit to his
account or is cashed over the counter.65 A bank could, however, be the
an honest mistake, i.e. in unconscious ignorance of the truth, the retention of the benefit is ordinarily inequitable. By the weight of authority restitution may be enforced.
Id. § 15, at 16.
62

Id. § 25.

Of the reported cases concerning postal money orders, only United States v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 35 F. Supp. 484 (D. MAinn. 1940), evoked any comment.
In support of the decision, see Notes, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 516 (1941), 14 So. Cal. L. Rev.
471 (1941). Contra, Notes, 9 Duke B. Ass'n J. 137 (1941), 40 Mich. L. Rev. 108 (1941).
64 See text accompanying note 53 supra.
65 The liability of banks in handling postal money orders may, of course, take many more
directions than are considered in this paper. The case of Jaselli v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 36
App. D.C. 159 (D.C. Cir. 1911), will serve to illustrate the point. In that case, the bank
was sued by a depositor for slander of credit in dishonoring checks for which Jaselli
maintained he had sufficient funds on deposit. The insufficiency of funds was brought about
by a repayment to the Government and a debit to the account of the sum of four postal
money orders (deposited and the proceeds collected from the post office about eighteen
months before) after the bank was notified about forged indorsements by a postal
inspector, an affidavit of forgery presented, and the orders returned through clearings.
The bank had failed after two attempts to notify its depositor of the claim before dishonoring the checks. The court held that whether forgery had taken place was a question
63
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purchaser or true owner of the instrument when, for example, it is taken
in payment of a loan or for services or goods. In the application of principles of agency, once an agent has performed his obligation in good

faith, he is not liable to the third party with whom he deals on behalf of
a principal.6 6 Thus, if a bank, as agent, receives a payment by mistake

and in good faith pays the money to its principal or customer, the bank
incurs no liability to the third party. This point was ably developed, by
68
way of dictum, by Judge Brewer in the Stockgrowers' Nat'l Bank case,
but for seventy-five years it did not receive the attention it deserved. Then

it was resurrected in a case involving raised money orders.
RAISED MoNEY ORDERS

In United States v. Cambridge Trust Co.,6" the latest reported case to
treat postal money orders, one Ralph Porter paid for various electrical
supplies and appliances purchased from the E.M.F. Electric Supply Company with postal money orders which he had raised approximately ninety
dollars each. 70 The money orders, payable to himself, were specially indorsed to the Supply Company which, in turn, restrictively indorsed 699
of them for deposit to its account at the Cambridge Trust Company. The
face amount of each order was paid by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston. When the Cambridge Trust Company received notice from the

Government that the orders were raised, 71 the bank had already paid the
of fact as was due diligence in giving notice. If, of course, due diligence could be shown,
the bank would not be liable for slander, but it is apparent that a bank cannot simply debit
a customer's account because of the Government's claim without laying itself open to suit
by its customer.
66 Restatement (Second), Agency § 339 (1958); Restatement, Restitution § 24 (1937).
67 The same result, at least with respect to domestic postal orders, is achieved by the
statute in England. Post Office Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 48, § 25 provides:
Any banker . . . who, in collecting in that capacity for any principal, shall have received payment.. . of any postal order, or of any document purporting to be a postal
order, shall not incur liability to anyone except that principal by reason of having
received the payment or allowance, or having held or presented the order or document
for payment; but this section shall not relieve any principal for whom any such order
or document has been so held or presented of any liability ....
68 United States v. Stockgrowers' Nat Bank, 30 Fed. 912, 914 (C.C.D. Colo. 1887).
The agency concept was rejected by the court in that case only because the bank, as far
as the Government knew, acted as principal in obtaining payment of the money orders.
It will be recalled that the money order form then in use did not contain the payee's
name; it was in the application form forwarded to the drawee post office. However, since
in the overwhelming majority of transactions a bank acts only as agent, there seems no
reason why a presumption of agency could not be created.
69 300 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1962).
70 Porter purchased $1.00 money orders in large blocks and spoiled 200 before learning
how to alter them successfully using sulfuric add neutralized by hypochloride to remove the
dollar limitation and dry pastel pigment to restore the color. Between October 1956 and
January 1958, he raised 1,062 money orders, which were collected by four banks, including
the Cambridge Trust Company. Although he was arrested and indicted in 1958, the Government did not see fit to bring Porter to trial until three years later when he was arrested
for passing a fresh batch of about 100 altered money orders. During April, 1961, Porter
pleaded guilty to altering 1,087 money orders and received a four-year sentence.
71 First notice to the Cambridge Trust Company was contained in the following letter,
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entire proceeds to the Supply Company. In affirming the district court's
entry of summary judgment against the Government, the court of appeals
relied solely upon the application of rules of agency." In summarizing
the court's views, Judge Woodbury stated:
In this situation there is no need to consider whether postal money orders
are to be treated as negotiable instruments or nonnegotiable instruments
when in fact being negotiable but once, they fit precisely into neither
category. The Bank is entitled to the benefit of the old and well-established
principle, applicable alike in cases involving negotiable instruments and
in those which do not, that a known agent who receives money paid to him
by mistake is protected from liability if innocently and in good faith
he has paid the money over to his principal before receipt of notice of the
payor's mistake.73
POSTAL MONEY ORDERS AND THE LAW MERCHANT
The more recent cases involving postal money orders74 have been
decided correctly but upon issues which have permitted the courts to
skirt conveniently around the deeper issue, that is, whether the sale of
postal money orders today is a commercial transaction subject to the rules
copy on file in the Loyola Law Library,
Inspector, dated January 14, 1958:
Gentlemen:
Enclosed are photostats of three postal
Branch of the Boston Post Office which
being prosecuted for this offense. The money
NUMBER OF
DATE OF
MONEY ORDER
ISSUE
1-22,912,674
10-16-56
1-22,912,675
10-16-56
1-22,911,690
10-8-56

from the Post Office Department, Office of

money orders issued at the Cambridge A
were altered by Ralph W. Porter who is
orders are described below:
ISSUED
RAISED
LOSS TO THE
FOR
TO
GOVERNMENT
$1.00
$97.00
$ 96.00
1.00
97.00
96.00
1.00
91.00
90.00
Total Government Loss
$282.00
These three money orders were deposited in your bank by the E.M.F. Electric Supply
Company, and your bank guaranteed prior endorsements.
It will be appreciated if you will forward to me a check for $282.00, payable to the
Post Office Department, so that this Government loss may be adjusted.
You may use for the purpose the enclosed official envelope which requires no postage.
Sincerely yours,
(signed)
Postal Inspector
72 In considering the matter of the disclosure of the agency relationship, and in meeting
the Government's contention that the Stockgrowers' Bank case (see note 68 supra) was
determinative of the question, the court reasoned that since postal money orders can, according to law, be transferred only once (by the payee, Porter, to E.M.F. Electric Supply
Co.) the Government knew that it was making payment not to the owner but to the owner's
agent for collection. United States v. Cambridge Trust Co., 300 F.2d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 1962).
73 Ibid. Applying agency principles relied upon in the Cambridge Trust case, banks have
been relieved from liability in cases involving stolen blank money orders. See United States v.
Bank of Hollywood, Civil No. 65-324, S.D. Fla., Aug. 27, 1965; United States v. Wilton
Manors Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 65-497, S.D. Fla., Sept. 30, 1965.
74 United States v. Cambridge Trust Co., supra note 72; United States v. Citizens &
Southern Nat'l Bank, 144 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Ga. 1956); United States v. Arnhold &
S. Bleichroeder, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).

1967]

LEGAL ASPECTS OF POSTAL MONEY ORDERS

of the law merchant 7 5 -especially finality of payment-or whether it is
still a function of sovereignty. But the right question will eventually have
to be raised, and the issue joined where it ought to be, namely, whether
or not the public policy evident in the earlier cases7 6 makes sense today.
However much validity there once may have been to the contention that
the Government is exercising a sovereign function in selling money orders,
that contention is now open to serious doubt. If the sale of postal money
orders is in direct competition with those sold by private enterprise, or if
the Government has for its own benefit injected them into the normal
stream of commerce, then it would seem only logical to conclude that their
issuance is no more an action of sovereign capacity than is the issuance of
77
checks, bonds, or notes.
When the postal money order system was inaugurated in 1864,78 it may
have been a unique service to provide those persons who did not have
checking accounts with a substitute for money. Since that time, however,
most banks and several nonbanking establishments have also entered the
money order market, and the service has come to assume all the aspects
of a commercial venture. A representative comparision of the fees charged
for money orders will reveal that the Government charges not only as
much as its competitors, but usually more.
75 There are only a few indications that the direction of the cases is toward subjecting
money orders to the law merchant. In a conflict of laws problem, the commercial law of a
foreign country was, in effect, held applicable to postal money orders.
United States v. Arnhold & S. Bleichroeder, Inc., supra note 74, involved suit to recover payment made on 42 money orders which contained forgeries of the payees'
indorsements. The money orders had been lost by or stolen from members of the
armed forces overseas and they were cashed by a Swiss bank. The defendant had
acted as the Swiss bank's agent for collection. In granting a motion for letters rogatory,
the court held that a defense that under Swiss law good title passes to a good faith purchaser, for substantial value in the ordinary course of business, of instruments with forged
indorsements was not so insufficient as a matter of law as to cause the court to strike the
defense on its own initiative. If it is the nature of a money order itself, as determined by
the statutes under which it is issued, that precludes a money order from being subject
to domestic commercial law, there is no compelling reason why a court should have to
apply foreign commercial law.
For a review of foreign commercial law relating to negotiable instruments, see Murray,
"Forged Bills of Exchange and Checks: A Comparison of the Anglo-American, European
and Latin American Law," 82 Banking L.J. (pts. 1-2) 565, 659 (1965).
76 United States v. Stockgrowers' Nat'l Bank, 30 Fed. 912 (C.CD.Colo. 1887); Bolognesi
v. United States, 189 Fed. 335 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 726 (1911); United States v.
Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 35 F. Supp. 484 (D. Minn. 1940).
77 It has long been held that in the issuance of checks and similar instruments, the
Government subjects itself to the ordinary rules regarding commercial paper. E.g., Cooke v.
United States, 91 U.S. 389 (1875); United States v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 252 U.S. 485 (1920);
United States v. National Exchange Bank, 270 U.S. 527 (1926). But in determining what
constitutes a forged indorsement, the fictitious payee rule has not been adopted in federal
common law on the ground that a defaulting employee's knowledge is not imputed to the
Government. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 205 Fed. 433 (9th Cir. 1913),
judgment aff'd on new opinion, 224 F. 679 (9th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 241 U.S. 658 (1916).
78 See note 1 supra.
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Amount of Fees Charged
Amount of
Money Order

US. Postal
Money Order 7 9

American Express
Money Order8 O

Bank
Money Order8l

Bank
Money Order 8 2

$ 0.01 to $10
$10.01 to $50
$50.01 to $100

$0.25
.35
.45

$0.20-.30
.35
.45

$0.15
.15
.15

$0.10
.10
.10

Thus, it is no longer true that the postal money order system is carried on
"not for gain, but to supply a public need."8 3 It is in direct competition
with bank money orders, private money orders, and numerous "purchased
check" devices such as cashier's checks, registered checks, and travelers
checks, all of which are subject to the laws governing commercial transactions.
Even though at one time all postal money orders were payable only
at post office branches, they have long been collected through banking
channels, as is evident from the cases already considered. And to promote
such a collection procedure, which obviously inures solely to the benefit
of the Government, bank stamps are not treated as indorsements.84 But
not only has the Government encouraged the introduction of postal money
orders into the private commercial world, it has practically insured it
since 1951 by providing during that year that Federal Reserve Banks
may pay money orders.8 5 The result of that provision is that now very
few money orders are cashed by post offices. During the five-year period
from 1961 through 1965, the average annual sales of postal money orders
amounted to 243,533,600 with a value of $4,771,907,270.86 During the
same period, an average of 241,607,800, or 99% of the money orders
issued with a value of $4,671,212,000, or 97.9%, were handled not by post
offices but by commercial banks and were paid by Federal Reserve
Banks.8 7 Thus, substantially all postal money orders have been deliberately injected into the usual stream of commerce by the Government
for its own benefit, and it is clearly untenable, if not an atomic attack
upon common sense, to deny the relevance to postal money orders of the
79 Rates effective March 26, 1966. Post. Bull. No. 20519 (1966).

80 The actual rates in effect on September 1, 1966 were: $0.01 to $5 -$0.20; $5 to $9.99

-$0.30; $10 to $49.99-$0.35; $50 to $100 -$0.40.
81 LaSalle Nat'l Bank, Chicago. Rate in effect on September 1, 1966 was $0.15 per money
order up to $250.
82 Harris Trust & Savings Bank, Chicago. Rate in effect on September 1, 1966 was $0.10
per money order up to $499.99.
83 Bolognesi v. United States, 189 Fed. 335, 336 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 726
(1911). See quotation in text accompanying note 39 supra.
84 See note 24 supra.
85 Post. Gen. Ann. Rep. 11-12 (1951). As fiscal agents of the United States, Federal
Reserve Banks on July 1, 1951 began processing punch card postal money orders. During the
last six months of 1951, they handled 175 million money orders. Fed. Res. Bank Ann. Rep.

46 (1951).

86 Computed from figures contained in Table 801, Post. Gen. Ann. Rep. 241 (1965).
87 Computed from figures contained in Table 10, Fed. Res. Bank Ann. Rep. 268 (1965).
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commercial law which governs the rights of all other parties dealing with
negotiable and nonnegotiable paper.88
To hold that postal money orders are subject to commercial law may,
like all categorizations, have the attraction of simplicity, but it is not
without the usual complications. In cases involving fraudulently issued
money orders, the Government could not refuse payment or shift its
loss to others, since the acts of its authorized but defaulting agent would
be imputed to it. But where a forged indorsement is involved, any payment could be recovered, and a bank or other collecting agent would
not be relieved of liability. Of greater importance in terms of loss frequency, however, would be the consequences of final payment of a
counterfeit, stolen and completed, or altered money order. In such cases,
the Government could not recover from a good faith holder for value
or from one who had in good faith changed his position in reliance upon
payment. But when would final payment take place? If, by agreement, the Federal Reserve Banks have the right to make a payment
which is not conditional, then when a cash payment is made or a provisional credit becomes irreversible, payment would be final. On the other
hand, if actual payment can be made only by the Post Office Department in Washington, through the Audit Division to which all money
orders are now sent, then its cash payment, final settlement, or
retention of a money order beyond a reasonable period of time without
notice of dishonor would constitute final payment.8 "
CONCLUSION

In the early cases involving the fraudulent issuance of postal money
orders and the theft of blank ones, the courts, in relieving the Government of any loss, made a drastic and intellectually unwarranted leap from
a perfectly proper legal concern for the public policy interest in governmental functions to a blatant disregard for justice and reason. If the
courts in the future decide that legal improvement is to be obtained only
through the loyal preservation of the past, then to maintain the direction
of the older cases they will have to hammer out new theories. Clearly
the old ones no longer have any persuasive force. Since postal money
orders are sold in direct competition with private enterprise and are
88 Although a postal money order is not a negotiable instrument, it has none of the
aspects of a simple contract and must be treated as a mercantile specialty. The law
merchant is applicable to such nonnegotiable instruments. United States v. Bank of New
York, 219 Fed. 648, 653 (2d Cir. 1914) (dictum); Norton, Bills and Notes 8-14 (4th ed.
1914). See generally Aigler, "Recognition of New Types of Negotiable Instruments," 24
Colum. L. Rev. 563 (1924); Goodrich, "Nonnegotiable Bills and Notes," 5 Iowa L. Bull. 65
(1920).
89 The recitation in this paragraph is intended merely to generalize about probable loss
distribution. Any definitive examination is beyond the scope of this article.
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injected into the normal stream of commerce, their sale cannot be treated
as a function of government, but rather must be viewed as a commercial
transaction at the same level as the Government's issuance of checks,
bonds, or notes. They are, therefore, subject to the law merchant as expressed in the federal common law or the Uniform Commercial Code °
Such a conclusion should not provide any anxious moments for those
sensitive spirits among us who are in perpetual agony about the rising
costs of government. Any additional losses to the Government should
be used as a factor in determining the fees charged for money orders
(although high enough now to produce a substantial profit in any efficient organization), 9 thereby achieving a relatively wide distribution
of loss by spreading it thinly among all postal order purchasers.
90 Although the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to instruments subject to
federal common law, there are indications that its provisions will be applied to the extent
possible on the theory that the Code is the best expression of the current commercial law.
See United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Padbloc Co. v. United
States, 161 Ct. Cl. 369 (1963); Reeves Soundcraft Corp., CCH 1964 Bd. Contract. App.
II 4317.
91 In fiscal year 1965, the fees paid for postal money orders amounted to $56,748,000.
Post. Gen. Ann. Rep. 198 (1965).

